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Antitrust Division · Criminal Cases Filed · FY2024

Antitrust Division Criminal Cases Filed, Fiscal Year 2024

New criminal antitrust cases — price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation — the Division filed against companies and individuals.

Sourced Figures

Year-Over-Year

Cases filed more than doubled from 9 in FY2023 to 20 in FY2024, alongside four major monopolization suits and the finalized 2023 Merger Guidelines -- the most platform-enforcement-heavy year in the set.

Notable Actions in FY2024

United States v. Google LLC (Search)

Judge Amit Mehta of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on August 5, 2024 that Google illegally maintains monopolies in general search and search text advertising.

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United States v. Apple Inc.

DOJ and 16 states sued on March 21, 2024 alleging Apple illegally monopolizes the smartphone market under Sherman Act Section 2.

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United States v. RealPage Inc.

DOJ and eight states sued on August 23, 2024 alleging RealPage’s algorithmic pricing software enabled landlord collusion on apartment rents.

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United States v. Visa Inc.

DOJ sued on September 24, 2024 alleging Visa monopolizes debit-card payment networks under Sherman Act Sections 1 and 2.

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What Changed in FY2024

DOJ and the FTC finalized the joint 2023 Merger Guidelines on December 18, 2023, replacing the 2010 Horizontal and 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines with a single, more enforcement-friendly framework.

Criterica Intelligence Read

Criminal antitrust cases are a low-volume, high-severity category, and the count in any given fiscal year is disproportionately driven by the number of active cartel investigations reaching the charging stage rather than by any broad measure of anticompetitive conduct in the economy. A single large international cartel investigation — auto parts, financial benchmarks, generic pharmaceuticals — can generate dozens of individual and corporate charges over several fiscal years as it works through the Division's leniency and cooperation pipeline, which means a single year's filed-case count is best read as one data point in a multi-year investigation cycle, not an independent signal.

Duration for criminal antitrust cases is long by design: cartel conduct is covert, and building a chargeable case typically requires grand jury subpoenas, cooperating-witness development through the Division's leniency program, and often years of investigation before the first charge is filed — meaning the filed-case count in a given fiscal year reflects investigative work that began years earlier. For a company under an active grand jury investigation, the realistic planning horizon extends well past the point of first learning about the investigation, with individual executives facing personal criminal exposure on a separate and often longer timeline than the corporate resolution.

For insurers and funders, criminal antitrust exposure is a compounding risk: a criminal conviction or guilty plea creates a nearly automatic predicate for follow-on civil treble-damages litigation from purchasers and competitors, which means the criminal case's resolution date is frequently the start of a second, separate multi-year civil exposure period rather than the end of the matter. Modeling criminal antitrust risk in isolation from the follow-on civil exposure it generates understates the total duration and cost of resolution significantly.

Resolution paths split between negotiated guilty pleas, which resolve the large majority of criminal antitrust matters, particularly for cooperating defendants under the Division's leniency program, and the smaller share that proceed to trial — typically individual defendants with strong personal incentive to contest liability even where the corporate entity has already pleaded guilty. Criterica Intelligence frames criminal antitrust filings as the leading edge of a longer risk arc that includes follow-on civil exposure, for the companies, insurers, and funders that need to see the full cycle rather than a single fiscal year's charging count.

See How Antitrust Division Patterns Inform Duration Intelligence
Frequently Asked Questions
How many criminal cases filed did the Antitrust Division report for FY2024?

Total criminal cases filed: 20, per DOJ Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics FY 2015-2024 (as of 2025-02-01).

How does FY2024 compare with the prior fiscal year?

Cases filed more than doubled from 9 in FY2023 to 20 in FY2024, alongside four major monopolization suits and the finalized 2023 Merger Guidelines -- the most platform-enforcement-heavy year in the set.

What is a notable Antitrust Division action from FY2024?

United States v. Google LLC (Search): Judge Amit Mehta of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on August 5, 2024 that Google illegally maintains monopolies in general search and search text advertising.

What changed in Antitrust Division enforcement priorities in FY2024?

DOJ and the FTC finalized the joint 2023 Merger Guidelines on December 18, 2023, replacing the 2010 Horizontal and 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines with a single, more enforcement-friendly framework.

Figures on this page are drawn from official agency publications, cited individually below, and reflect the agency’s own reporting as of the date shown for each figure. They are not Criterica Intelligence model outputs, are not predictions, and are not a measure of any party’s legal exposure or liability. Agencies periodically revise prior-year figures; where a revision is known, both figures are shown with their sources. This page does not constitute legal, investment, or compliance advice.

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