Concrete and Cement Additives
The Concrete and Cement Additives MDL was centralized in the Southern District of New York in April 2024, with Judge Lewis J. Liman presiding over pretrial proceedings. The litigation alleges that manufacturers of the chemical additives used to control the strength, curing time, and workability of concrete and cement coordinated pricing rather than competing independently, with concrete producers and construction materials purchasers as the claimant pool.
As a docket centralized only in 2024, this litigation sits early in the typical MDL lifecycle, and its duration and resolution risk are currently driven by the same early-stage variables that shape most young antitrust MDLs: how quickly the parties move through initial discovery, how the plaintiffs' proposed classes are defined and briefed, and whether early dispositive motions narrow the scope of the alleged conduct or the class of eligible purchasers. None of those questions has necessarily settled yet at this stage, which is a meaningfully different posture than a decade-old antitrust docket already administering a settlement fund.
Because the alleged conduct is a relatively conventional horizontal price-fixing theory among a defined set of manufacturers — rather than a novel theory like algorithmic coordination or a foreclosure-based rebate program — the resolution path here is likely to follow a more familiar pattern: class-certification briefing, expert battles over a purchaser overcharge model, and then either negotiated settlement or trial on the certified class's claims. The pace at which that pattern unfolds is the main open variable at this stage.
For firms and allocators trying to gauge how much runway a docket like this actually has before it produces meaningful resolution signals, tracking its current procedural stage accurately — rather than assuming a generic MDL timeline — is central to Criterica Intelligence's regulated outcomes intelligence approach across every active docket it covers, including how this one's pace compares with other recently centralized commercial antitrust matters.
Manufacturers of chemical additives used to control concrete's strength, curing time, and workability allegedly coordinated pricing rather than competing independently, harming concrete producers and construction materials purchasers who bought those additives.
It was centralized in April 2024, so pretrial coordination, class definition, and the scope of discovery are still developing — a meaningfully different posture than a decade-old antitrust MDL already administering a settlement.
A fairly conventional horizontal price-fixing pattern: class-certification briefing, expert disputes over the purchaser overcharge model, and then either a negotiated settlement or trial on the certified class's claims.
The certified or remaining claims proceed through continued discovery and dispositive motions on the price-fixing theory, either within the coordinated docket or after remand to the originating court for trial.
Statistics shown reflect historical or illustrative model outputs derived from real case data. They are not predictions or guarantees of any individual outcome. Litigation results depend on facts, jurisdiction, judge, and counsel, and vary case by case. Model accuracy is subject to selection effects and changing legal dynamics.