Antitrust Division Merger Challenges, Fiscal Year 2022
Merger transactions the Division sought to block in court, or resolved through a consent decree requiring divestiture or other restructuring.
Year-Over-Year
Merger complaints eased slightly to 10 from FY2021’s 12, but pre-suit abandonments jumped to 10 -- up from zero the prior year -- as new leadership signaled a more litigation-forward posture.
Notable Actions in FY2022
DOJ sued in November 2021 to block the $2.18 billion publishing merger; a 13-day trial was held in August 2022.
SOURCE ↗DOJ sued in November 2021 to block the $315 million acquisition; the District of Delaware ruled against DOJ in September 2022 and the deal closed.
SOURCE ↗Merger challenges are the most transaction-specific and time-bounded category in antitrust enforcement, because the underlying event — a proposed merger — has its own external deal timeline that constrains how long a challenge can run before the parties abandon the transaction, restructure it, or the Division litigates to a defined outcome. That structural time-boundedness makes merger-challenge duration more predictable than almost any other enforcement category discussed on this site, even though the number of matters that reach a challenge in any given fiscal year is a small fraction of total HSR-reportable transactions reviewed.
Duration for merger challenges is shaped heavily by whether the Division seeks a preliminary injunction in federal court — which forces a resolution on a compressed, court-driven schedule, typically resolved within months given the deal-timeline pressure on the parties — versus a negotiated consent decree requiring divestiture, which can be reached earlier in the review process without litigation. The trend in how often the Division litigates versus settles by consent decree is itself a signal of enforcement posture that shifts across fiscal years and administrations, with direct implications for how quickly a challenged deal is likely to resolve.
For funders and financial parties with exposure to pending transactions — break-fee provisions, financing commitments tied to closing conditions — the merger-challenge rate and resolution-path mix in a given fiscal year is a direct input to deal-timeline and break-fee risk modeling, since a shift toward more frequent litigated challenges rather than negotiated consent decrees extends the expected time to close or abandon across an entire portfolio of pending deals, not just the specific transaction under challenge.
Resolution paths split among abandonment (the parties walk away rather than litigate or restructure), consent decree with divestiture (the parties restructure the deal to resolve the Division's concerns), and litigated outcome (the Division seeks and either obtains or fails to obtain an injunction in federal court). Criterica Intelligence frames merger-challenge data as a deal-timeline risk input, structurally different from the open-ended duration profile of conduct-based antitrust enforcement, for the funders, insurers, and dealmakers pricing transaction risk.
See How Antitrust Division Patterns Inform Duration IntelligenceMerger complaints filed: 10, per DOJ Antitrust Division, Workload Statistics FY 2015-2024 (as of 2025-02-01).
Merger complaints eased slightly to 10 from FY2021’s 12, but pre-suit abandonments jumped to 10 -- up from zero the prior year -- as new leadership signaled a more litigation-forward posture.
United States v. Penguin Random House / Simon & Schuster: DOJ sued in November 2021 to block the $2.18 billion publishing merger; a 13-day trial was held in August 2022.
No sourced policy change specific to FY2022 has been confirmed for this category yet.
Figures on this page are drawn from official agency publications, cited individually below, and reflect the agency’s own reporting as of the date shown for each figure. They are not Criterica Intelligence model outputs, are not predictions, and are not a measure of any party’s legal exposure or liability. Agencies periodically revise prior-year figures; where a revision is known, both figures are shown with their sources. This page does not constitute legal, investment, or compliance advice.